ARTICLE
ABSTRACT
We consider decision about the choice of a lawyer as a particular case of self-insurance-cumprotection when the lawyer’s cost is repaid in case of victory. The problem was introduced by Sevi and Yafil (2005) in the context of self-protection, which requires assumption that the size of loss does not depend on effort (level of the expenditure on lawyer). In this paper we drop that assumption and our model includes possibility that both loss and probability of incurring a loss depend on effort. We prove that unlike the standard cases of SP and SICP, the level of effort is monotone in risk aversion. We interpret and explain the result in terms of mean-preserving spread and increasing riskiness in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz. We prove that increase in SICP with indemnity leads to increased riskiness of the utility of final wealth. As a consequence, the more risk-averse individual is, the less she invests in legal expenses.
KEYWORDS
self-protection, self-insurance-cum-protection, riskiness, risk-aversion
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