Zbigniew Świtalski

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We define, for some variant of a many-to-many market model of Gale-Shapley type, a concept of generalized competitive equilibrium and show that, under suitable conditions, stable matchings in such a model can be represented as competitive equilibria allocations (and vice versa). Our results are far-reaching generalizations of the “discrete supply and demand lemma” of Azevedo, Leshno (2011) for the college admissions market.
Using the results of Alkan, Gale (2003), we also prove a theorem on existence of generalized equilibria in our model.


stable matching, Gale-Shapley theory, many-to-many model, competitive equilibrium, discrete market model, contract theory


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