Jakub Witkowski

(Polish) PDF


The aim of this paper is to assess efficiency of verification policies used in charity organizations. Verification policy can be introduced to ensure that aid is granted only to people who are eligible for it. However, it bears costs for the program’s organizers. The paper provides a theoretical model assessing economic efficiency of ver ification policy using optimization and simulation methods. Depending on characteristics of the program one of three decisions might be optimal: granting aid without verification, granting aid only to positively verified people or not granting aid at all. Therefore, in order to make a decision about introducing verification policy charity organization should analyze parameters of the program such as: average amount of aid, average cost of verification and percentage of people eligible to obtain help in the program.


charity aid, optimization, linear programming


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